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Abstract 
Nascent revival of dialogue is struggling to reach its potential within the postmodern 
organizational milieu. Concurrently, interpersonal intersubjectivity has steadily been de-
pathologized, via reassessments of countertransference in the psychoanalytic sphere, 
allowing exploration of its utility in other domains of relational process.  Effective use of 
dialogue is critical and foundational to developing meaningful and sustainable enterprise 
in the immediate future. Despite the risks, intentionally explored intersubjectivity is a 
powerful tool to enrich the container of dialogue. This paper qualitatively explores the 
literature on intersubjectivity and dialogue with an hermeneutic approach to discern the 
implications of their convergence for collaborative workgroups in emergent enterprise.  
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Introduction 
 This hermeneutic study is driven by the question of what positive implications  
are to be found through reconciliation of intersubjectivity and dialogue for postmodern 
collaborative workgroups. The approach to this question is to inquire of, and interpret, 
the literature about their intrinsic nature, how they effect each other, and the a priori 
ontology and epistemology of their critical elements and uses. Hence, the following two 
sections are literature reviews of a broad selection of social science perspectives on 
intersubjectivity and dialogue.  
[I wish to disclose how I came to select this particular research question. My 27 
years of successful work using dialogue, empathy, and redirection in sales and 
marketing work, and more intensely in pastoral care work led me to this thread: 
1) What core ontological and epistemological roots inform this amazing praxis? 
2) What is the distinct nature of the dialogical container vis-à-vis the 
intersubjective field such that the former effects the latter? 
3) What positive implications (or promise) would a hermeneutic study of those 
phenomena reveal for the postmodern, collaborative workgroup, given the 
plethora of theoretical and methodological tools available to intensify the 
dialogical container? 
Recognizing that the first two questions are subordinate to the third, I structured the 
research around the third question and began with the foundational work in the first and 
second questions.] 
 Herein the term workgroup signifies between 2 and 20 interdependent individuals 
who share proximity, tools, purpose, and identity. Herein the term collaborative signifies 
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a shared intention to optimize outputs while minimizing costs and externalities. Herein 
the term postmodern signifies a workgroup which is likely to be, or become, highly 
diversified with respect to its members’ races, ethnicities, genders, ages, memes, 
sexual inclinations, cognitive and affective capacities, behavioral control, instrumental 
and communicative skills, political, philosophical, and religious orientations and depth, 
and any number of disparate values, deconstructed identities and fragmented lifestyles. 
Their interactions are significantly face-to-face and intermediated with technology.  
 The section Postmodern Collaborative Workgroups is a survey of theories and 
factors that may either directly or heuristically intensify  or attenuate the quality of the 





The study of human group life has a multitude of “roots, variations, issues and 
debates” (Prus, 1996, p. 10) that run through the gamut of social sciences. One simple 
definition of intersubjectivity is the shared meaning generated through the social, 
physical, neurolinguistic, and dialogical interactions of people, however this 
understanding is not sufficient to appreciate its polysemic nature and growing 
significance in many social sciences.  Wikipedia (.org) at one point in its ever changing 
offerings gave three meanings—consensual agreement, participation, and co-creation—
each closely related in social interaction.  A review of the literature reveals many other 
perspectives on the term as it evolves from historical traditions such as the I–Thou and 
I–Other dyads of Buber (1937). Definitions and names for intersubjectivity also shift with 
the perspectives of the fields, sciences, and disciplines that study and utilize it.  
Psychoanalysis 
Cooper-White (2004) traces an historical thread of the use of the term in the 
context of psychoanalysis. Countertransference, one of the terms largely synonymous 
with intersubjectivity, was a taboo topic in psychoanalytic circles until the mid 1950s with 
the exception of Harry Stack Sullivan, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, and Erich Fromm, 
whose works focused on the interpersonal dynamics between patients and others in 
their lives. Sullivan did not actually use the terms transference and countertransference, 
but rather referred to “parataxic interpersonal experiences, understood as distortions 
created by carryovers from either the patient’s or the therapist's childhood” (pp. 20-21). 
Lewin (1947) used the term paratactic distortions for the same purpose. Stolorow and 
Atwood (1992) report that although Sullivan was the first to replace Freud’s intrapsychic 
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determinism “with an emphasis on the centrality of social interaction” (p. 21), the 
concept of “parataxic distortion” compromised a full shift to intersubjective doctrine.  
Cultural shifts, beginning in the late 1950s, influenced by Heisenberg's 
Uncertainty Principle and Einstein's Theory of Relativity, began to open up a valuing of 
empathy and the subjective space between people—or as the space between 
subjectivities. Presented in 1957, a paper named Introspection, Empathy, and 
Psychoanalysis by Heinz Kohut kicked open the doors on the use of empathy 
(Harwood, 1998; Cooper-White, 2004) as a means and effective source of data 
gathering. Kohut distinguished empathy apart from the popular notion of "sympathy or 
warmth" (Cooper-White, 2004, p. 22). A number of analysts adopted this use of 
empathy in practice through the 1960s and 1970s with mixed results. A distinction 
between the pathological and non-pathological aspects of counter transference began 
to emerge in psychoanalytic literature toward the end of the 1970s. A number of 
converging forces which carried the positive utility of countertransference forward in the 
1980s included Kohut’s self-psychology movement; feminist thought and action; the rise 
of postmodernist philosophy; social constructionism (Cooper-White, 2004); quantum 
physics; nonlinear systems theory (Shaddock, 2000, citing Sucharov); and development 
of hermeneutics (Shaddock, 2000, citing Atwood & Stolorow). Since the 1980s there 
has emerged a distinct relational form of psychoanalysis that utilizes mutuality on both 
the conscious and unconscious levels to co-construct meaning between therapist and 
analysand and recognizes the uniqueness of the dyad. The positivist idea of the neutral 
authoritative expert has been displaced with an intersubjective, relational paradigm that 
allows for a wide range of mutuality, depending on the relative needs of the participants.  
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Within the evolving relational school of psychoanalytic theory Cooper-White 
(2004) describes a new reification praxis: 
Meaning and therefore reality itself in the form of one's worldview, is continually 
being coconstructed in relationships (including all helping relationships). 
Subjectivity is also no longer understood solely as the product of individual 
consciousness, but rather as a shared experience of reality in any given moment. 
Individual subjectivity is relativized in importance, in favor of a view toward 
intersubjectivity as a central (if not the central) area of knowing and experiencing 
of reality (p. 47). 
Self Psychology 
Contemporary intersubjective systems theory has largely arisen from Kohut’s 
psychoanalytic self psychology. It is a dyadic or two-person theory that forms a new 
paradigm in psychoanalytic circles also known as “relational model theorizing . . . dyadic 
systems perspective . . . [and] social constructivism” (Shaddock, 2000, p. 17, citing 
Mitchell, Beebe, and Hoffman respectively). The therapeutic method usually employs 
sustained empathic inquiry; remaining in the frame of the other; and self reference.  
Stolorow and Atwood (1992) were among the early theorists to extend Kohut’s 
use of the intersubjective field to a wider range of human interactions including group 
and intergroup relations. Group dynamics was of great concern to Kohut, who warned of 
the regressive propensities of, and iatrogenic risk within, groups, but recognized their 
potential for “decisive discoveries . . . and crucial new insight” (Harwood, 1998, p. 10) 
where empathic inquiry and disciplined commitment to process are observed.   
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Intersubjectivist group and family therapies structured around Kohutian selfobject 
(transference) can reveal many dynamics applicable to other small groups. A few 
negative examples are: toxic group myths, homeostatic systems-norming of shame and 
anger, cognitive and affectual boundary blurring, conditional mirroring predicated on 
conformity, traumatic rupture of protective myths, distorted or reductive meanings 
imposed on individual experience, over-stimulating affect tolerance set point, diffused or 
violated boundaries blocking self-delineation, pervasive defenses precluding 
acknowledgement or repair of injury, and concretization of subjective experience 
through “fixed identities (one child is the smart one, another is ‘cute’ but ineffectual) and 
enactment of fixed or ritualized behavior patterns” (see Shaddock, 2000, pp. 143-147).  
Shapiro, (1998, citing Lee & Martin) suggests the breakdown of totemic systems 
of shared values in urban industrialized society “leaves unfulfilled the need for twinship 
affirmation that had formerly been taken care of through sibling relationships and 
affiliation with an extended family or tribal structure” ( p. 50). “Twinship provides for the 
bonds that exist in a group. Intersubjectivity . . . provides the perspective with which to 
explore those bonds” (p. 56). The sense of belonging promotes healing and growth. 
Three realms of the unconscious (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992) derived from 
specific formative intersubjective contexts help to understand blockage of attunement 
with others and articulation of experience: 
Prereflective unconscious—The organizing principles that unconsciously shape 
and thematize a person’s experiences. [Derived from interplay of subjectivities of 
child and caregivers.] 
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Dynamic unconscious—Experiences that were denied articulation because they 
were perceived to threaten needed ties. [Derived from intersubjective transaction; 
specifically unintegrated affect states.] 
Unvalidated unconscious—Experiences [never] articulated because they never 
evoked the requisite validating responsiveness from the surround. (p. 33) 
Pastoral Care 
Another concurrent trend away from the unilateral observing and helping model 
is occurring in the social sciences. Remen (1996) describes helping as an inequality 
model of the strong helping the weak, the whole fixing the broken, the blessed helping 
the needy. “People feel this inequality. When we help we may inadvertently take away 
from people more than we ever could give them; we may diminish their self esteem, 
their sense of worth, integrity and wholeness” (p. 17). Cooper-White (2004) describes 
the positivist view of the helping relationship with similar dyads: “expert — client, knower 
— to be known, interpreter of data — source of data, subject — object, I — it” (p. 55).  
 Pastoral care ministries in the tradition of Stephen Ministries and BeFriender 
Ministries use the relational paradigm for spiritual healing. Mutuality is used as the 
exclusive relational modality for ministers relating to those visited.  It is defined as a 
“respectful give-and-take between people with the experience and frame of reference of 
each [to be] held worthy of dignity and respect” (BeFriender, 1997, sec. 2, p. 4).   
There are two levels of mutuality, that if practiced with integrity and authenticity, 
can lead to formation of genuine mutual relationship and spiritual growth.  Level 1 
combines the “telling the story appropriately” by those ministered to, with 
“understanding the story accurately from the [minister’s] perspective” (BeFriender, 1997, 
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sec. 2, p. 5).  This level is accomplished with active listening skills, total attention to the 
story, and suspension of all judgment and comparison to the minister’s “assumptive 
world” (p. 4) of ideas and values. After a solid base of trust and compassion is 
established and the one visited feels understood and empowered, the minister can lead 
the mutual relationship into Level 2.  The complementary elements of this level of 
mutuality are “giving feedback respectfully” and “receiving feedback with a measure of 
openness” (p. 5). 
Level 2 Mutuality occurs when the minister can safely share a reaction to what 
was heard in the context of each person’s assumptive world.  It is done carefully with 
extreme reverence for the other’s dignity and validity, and is always expressed with an “I 
feel _______ (a feeling word) when _______ (a non-evaluative story detail) because I 
_______ (reference to one’s own assumptive world)” (BeFriender, 1997, sec. 3, p. 15).  
Brief, appropriate self-disclosure is offered as a thought alternative only, and not as a 
persuasion to a new worldview. At this point in the relationship the minister remembers 
that the assumptive world of each party makes possible, and at the same time limits, the 
interpretation of what each has heard from other.  That interpretation in any case will 
affect, change, alter, or transform the assumptive world of each in an iterative and self-
reflexive manner. This level of mutuality need not be reached expediently, but when and 
if it is achieved, it forms a completely mutual and authentic relationship.  That 
relationship can catalyze spiritual healing and growth with both parties. 
The cultivation of trust for Level 1 Mutuality requires disciplined confidentiality. 
Going forward, empathy is the tool with which to achieve Level 2 Mutuality. Sweeten, 
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Ping, and Sweeten (1993) define empathy as a rigorous balancing of “thought” with 
“feeling”—of “needing to be right” with “needing to be needed” (pp. 114-115). 
Buber and Habermas 
Martin Buber (1937) explained the perils of the "I and it" relationship shortly after 
Freud's major works were published, but it did not deter the hegemony of Freud's 
followers until recent years. Buber (1992) found “. . . communicative openness is 
maximized in situations which have certain structural attributes. The most important 
such attribute is that the participants have a strong commitment to direct interpersonal 
relations. The emphasis on such communicative situations seems close to the more 
recent formulations by Jürgen Habermas” (Buber, 1992, Editor’s Introduction, pp. 11-
12). For Habermas “the intersubjective sphere has an autonomous existence, beyond 
any one individual” (Grady & Wells, 1985) whereas Buber’s focus is on the spiritual and 
transcendent qualities of dialogic exchange (Buber, 1992). Cooper-White (2004) also 
links Habermas with the spirit of this new paradigm: 
If reality is no longer seen as imposed, but coconstructed in relationship, then 
relations among people require a higher level of intentional listening and 
intentional speaking. The 'ideal speech situation' to use the language of Jürgen 
Habermas, will be one of inter-subjectivity (p. 188). 
Phenomenology 
 Habermas offers descriptions of intersubjectivity that are consistently tied to the 
understanding of utterances and written symbols between communicators (Habermas, 
1981b), and it would appear difficult to refute that many levels of intersubjective 
agreement can be achieved through rhetoric (Grady & Wells, 1985) but he does not 
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appear to agree on the foundations of ontological development of the Other in the 
manner of Edmond Husserl’s generative phenomenology (Donohoe, 2004). As 
Donohoe (2004) and Zahavi (2001a) suggest, Habermas and others who have 
approached the problem of understanding the Other have taken various routes that 
don’t include the later work of Husserl because his unpublished manuscripts have not 
been accessible until recently. In examining Habermas (1968, 1981a), most reference 
to Husserl’s work points to the static phenomenology which Habermas (1981a) credits 
with laying a foundation for understanding [Verstehen] of Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s 
subsequent works. This leaves a lost opportunity to see what Habermas’ treatment of 
intersubjectivity would look like with the generative ideas of time perception and the 
streaming, living present that Husserl finally developed in his last decade as constitutive 
of intersubjectivity. However: 
… it is possible to recognize some ways in which Habermas is indebted to 
Husserl for themes relating to the notions of the lifeworld and constitution. 
Habermas is critical of Husserl for a social theory that is grounded in constitution, 
indicating that he does not except to the transcendental intersubjective theory of 
Husserl that identifies intersubjectivity as constituting and not constituted 
(Donohoe, 2004, p. 12). 
Habermas does not indicate any reference to Husserl beyond the published 
Cartesian Meditations and Crisis of the European Sciences, neither of which explicate 
the role of temporality and streaming, living present in the evolution of ego, Other, and 
community that Husserl addresses in the late manuscripts. Habermas (1968) described 
ego development simply as this: 
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In the communication structure of the polis, individuation has progressed to the 
point where the identity of the individual ego as a stable entity can only be 
developed through identification with abstract laws of cosmic order (p. 307). 
In contrast, Husserl’s genetic analysis says that an ego acquires capabilities and 
convictions over time—and even from pre-egoic time—to form habitualities which 
constitute and re-constitute the ego and the world it experiences (i.e. Others) in 
successive layering which creates time (Donohoe, 2004).  The ego acquires 
sedimentations of experience from prior traditions and ongoing interaction with Others. 
Donohoe describes generative analysis as a regressive inquiry to uncover those layers; 
to “peel away” (p. 35-36) these constitutional sedimentations of the individual and its 
preceding generations. In contrast to where Habermas leaves off, Donohoe draws from 
Husserl’s C-manuscripts1:  
The temporal reduction to the streaming, living present reveals a position where I 
am with others in a more original way than Husserl's [early] analysis of empathy 
allows. The ego is with the Other in a radically immediate way. It is a level where 
there is a coincidence with others on the original level of constitution, my 
coincidence, so to speak, before there is constituted a world for myself and 
others. The lived experience belongs to both the ego and the Other as lived. It is 
only distinguished as belonging to the ego or the Other when it is subsequently 
thematized. It must belong to both as opposed to belonging to one or the other 
because if it did not belong to both, it would be referring to a time that would be 
cosmological rather than lived human time. It is only through the process of 
                                            
1   Husserl, E. (2006). Späte Texte über Zeitkonstitution (1929-1934): Die C-Manuskripte. Reihe: 
Husserliana Materialien, Band 8.   ISBN: 1-4020-4121-7 
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asking back initiated by genetic phenomenology that one is able to make such a 
claim. (p.87) 
Although both philosophers have much insight to offer on the foundations of 
intersubjectivity, Zahavi (2001b) simplifies their differences as Habermas’ focus on 
linguistics and his not yet knowing or acknowledging that Husserl’s passive and active 
synthesis of generative intersubjectivity includes linguistic and extra-linguistic forms.  
Evolutionary Theory 
Wheeler (2000) offers intersubjectivity as a new way of thinking about 
evolutionary theory from the perspective of the relationship between organisms and not 
the features of the individual organism. Wheeler draws from experience in Gestalt 
psychology to eschew the atomistic trend in Western thought, and points to Homer’s 
Odysseus as a prototype of evolved humanity as evidenced by the character’s unique 
use of intersubjective skill. In Jung’s analysis of the Book of Job, Wheeler shows how 
Job is defined through his relationship with God, and presumably with the counselors 
who visit to dissuade him from his intersubjective connection to God. Wheeler is also 
said to have postulated that the sudden increase in hominid brain size at the point of 
divergence from adult chimp brain size may have been driven by social complexity—
contrasting it with the view of some archeologists who attribute the change to manual 
coordination with tools. An insightful quote taken from Wheeler is “I am loved, therefore 







Coelho and Figueiredo (2003) also credit Husserl with turning the tide on modern 
philosophical tradition that supposes the “I” as self-constituted and presuppose the 
subject / object opposition as an a priori given. The authors also point to a number of 
other philosophers—including Scheler, Buber and Marcel—who define intersubjectivity 
in similar fashion to Husserl as “a sense of interpersonal communion between subjects 
who are attuned to one another in their emotional states and in their respective 
expressions” (p. 196). Secondly the authors distinguish Habermas’ understanding of 
intersubjectivity “as that which defines joint attention to objects of reference in a shared 
domain of linguistic or extra-linguistic conversation” (p. 196). A third interpretation of 
intersubjectivity offered is “the capacity for inferences to be established concerning the 
intentions, beliefs and feelings of others” (p. 196) as related to Einfühlung [or] empathy. 
A fourth interpretation Coelho and Figueiredo cite from Jolivet is “the situation in which, 
through their mutual relations, [two or more] subjects form a society or community or a 
common field and can speak of us” (p. 196). The authors consider all four definitions as 
facets of intersubjectivity that are simultaneously in play. As so many writers and 
theorists along with Donohoe (2004) and Zahavi (2001a) have pointed out, Coelho and 
Figueiredo also only cite Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations as their source of tribute to the 
ground shift in perspective which phenomenology brings to the value and praxis of  
intersubjectivity. This leaves the challenge of using these insights, in conjunction with 
Husserl’s more generative phenomenology revealed in recently translated later works, 





Bråten (2003, p. 263) correlates three levels of ontogenetic development in 
infants that resonate with Coelho and Figueiredo’s delineation of trans-subjective 
intersubjectivity . A “primary level of sensorimotor attunement and interpersonal 
communion in the mode of felt intimacy prevailing throughout life” begins in the first two 
months after birth. A “secondary level of object-oriented intersubjective attunement and 
joint attention to objects . . . [begins] at around nine months of age when infants identify 
others as agents and movers of objects.” The “tertiary level of intersubjective 
understanding [entails] first-order mental understanding of self and others in 
representational mediacy, mediated by personal pronouns and a sense of verbal self 
and others in symbolic conversation” beginning between 18 and 24 months, and 
“second-order mental understanding of others’ minds . . . “ beginning between 3 and 6 
years of age. 
Consciousness Studies  
 Christian de Quincey (2005) situates intersubjectivity in second-person, I–Thou 
perspectives. He places subjectivity in first-person I–I perspective of personal 
“contemplation.” He places objectivity in third-person I–It perspective “as in study of the 
brain” (p. 2). In the same text he cites Jacques’ Tripartite Intersubjectivity which can be 
described as an I–Thou–He/She triad to allow for "presence of absence—the felt 
presence of the departed other…how it is when an absent spouse or boss hovers in the 
background of many conversations” (p. 200). de Quincey (2005) delineates his second-
person perspective into three meanings for intersubjectivity: 
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Intersubjectivity – 1. We connect by communicating. This starts by assuming the 
Cartesian notion of self-encapsulated subjects, individual "I"s who connect with 
each other by exchanging physical signals (for example by speaking or writing). 
Individuals form relationships through communication. We could call this 
"linguistic" intersubjectivity--and this is the weakest meaning of the three. 
Intersubjectivity – 2. We condition each other. Individual subjects don't 
merely exchange signals; we change each other's sense of self. By engaging 
and participating in communication, we condition each other's experience. This is 
"mutual conditioning" intersubjectivity--and is mutual strength.  
Intersubjectivity – 3. We co-create each other. This is the most radical of 
all the types of intersubjectivity because it means that individuals don't merely 
influence and change each other by communicating and participating in 
relationships, but literally co-create each other's existence. Rather than 
connecting by exchanging signals and informing each other ("linguistic"), or 
coming together in relationships and changing each other ("mutual conditioning"), 
this strongest meaning implies that relationships are primary and that our sense 
of individuality is secondary, arising from a network of relationships. (p. 183-184) 
Ethnographic Research 
 Herbert Blumer created the term “symbolic interaction” in 1937 to describe the 
intersubjective phenomena of human group life. Blumer fully credited his insights on the 
reflective, interactive and emergent nature of group life to his mentor George Herbert 
Mead (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994). Combining Mead’s position that society is essentially an 
ongoing process of action (Prus, 1996; Athens, 2005) with the hermeneutic principles of 
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Wilhelm Dilthey, Blumer created an analytical research method of interpreting actions 
and signals between persons to determine how each is influenced by the other. Prus 
(1996) cites Dilthey for clear and unequivocal direction: 
Dilthey stressed the fundamentally intersubjective nature of human behavior: that 
human life is group life and is built on a sharedness of understandings. 
Interpretation . . . depends pivotally on making sense of the other by reference to 
the community context in which the actions of the other are embedded. A self 
without another, an outer without an inner—these are merely senseless words 
(pp. 35-36).  
 Blumer’s method, known as Chicago-style symbolic interaction, is scalable from 
dyads to large groups. His post-Cartesian interactionist framework, as influenced by 
Mead and Dilthey, is strictly founded on interpretation of actions and language, which is 
not to say it’s inconsistent with the study of emotionality (i.e. fear, shame, etc.) as a 
generic social process. “[The framework] embraces equally well such relationships as 
cooperation, conflict, domination, exploitation, consensus, disagreement, closely knit 
identification, and indifferent concern for one another” (Prus, 1996, citing Blumer, p. 72).  
 The interactionist school of thought which began with the work of Mead and as 
advanced by Blumer and others, takes as a given that those who interact with words 
and action intersubjectively share a common reality at that particular point in time. 
“Intersubjectivity is . . . a social accomplishment, a set of understandings sustained in 
and through the shared assumptions of interaction and recurrently sustained in 
processes of typification” (Gubrium & Holstein, 1994, p. 489). Mead was a 
contemporary of Husserl’s though there is no evidence they knew of each other’s work. 
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Resonant with Husserl’s “streaming, living present” is the “specious present” of Mead 
(Stacey, 2003, p. 36), whose theory of the emergence of mind and self out of the social 
process of communication became the foundation of the symbolic interactionist school 
(p. 37). It is the moment-to-moment impressions that become sedimented and 
constitutive of the ego to form habitualities of behavior within dyads and groups. 
"Culture is the emergence of pattern in the form of habits. What we call culture is that 
aspect of our emergent interaction that is iterated as continuity" (p. 37). 
Neurobiology 
 Gallese (2003) describes a new hypothetical tool named the shared manifold of 
intersubjectivity “that can be empirically tested at [three] levels both in healthy and 
psychotic individuals” (p. 178). Three operational levels of the shared manifold are: the 
phenomenological, the functional, and the subpersonal. Gallese claims that the implicit 
recognition humans have for one another has a neurological basis in identification 
mapping of specialized F5 area visuomotor neurons of the ventral premotor cortex 
shared with macaque monkeys, and with the homologically comparable Broca’s region 
in humans, known as mirror neurons. “Mirror neurons require, in order to be activated 
by visual stimuli, an interaction between the action’s agent . . . and its object” (p. 173). 
Gallese and his colleagues propose that “mirror neurons may constitute a neural 
mechanism enabling implicit action understanding” (p. 173). Human brain imaging 
experiments have revealed an extended sensorimotor integration process that 
“instantiates an ‘internal copy’ of [intentional] actions utilized not only to generate and 
control goal-related behaviors, but also to provide—at a prereflexive and prelinguistic 
level—a meaningful account of behaviors performed by other individuals” (p. 174).  
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 Citing Lipps and Husserl on their perspectives of empathy, Gallese (2003) 
conceives Einfühlung as “an intentional form of perception by analogy” (p. 175). 
Gallese’s hypothesis is that this neural substrate of mirror neurons, when activated, 
creates a “subpersonally instantiated common space” (p. 176) that “could . . . underpin 
our capacity to share feelings and emotions with others . . . that [in turn] can be 
empathized and . . . implicitly understood . . . “ (p. 176).  
 These studies continue and have not yet shown how damage to the mirror 
neurons may modulate intersubjective capacity (Bower, 2005a, citing Nakahara & 
Miyashita). One recent exception has been MRI studies of autistic children by Mirella 
Dapretto and colleagues that suggest a correlation of reduced activity in, and blood flow 
to, the mirror neuron system (Scientific American, 2005; Bower, 2005b). Autistics are 
known to suffer lack of intersubjective awareness. 
 The hormones oxytocin and vasopressin have been found to intermediate social 
interactions between individuals. Pollack and colleagues have determined that lack of 
parental bonding in the first two years of child development deprives the child’s ability to 
produce oxytocin later in life. Oxytocin elevates trust levels between individuals. 
Neglected children exhibit low levels of oxytocin after efforts to comfort them. The 
researchers also found low levels of vasopressin in adopted children. “This hormone, 
they say, is critical for recognizing individuals as familiar, an essential step in forming 
social bonds” (Wade, 2005). 
 The drug ecstacy (3-4 methylenedioxymethamphetamine or MDMA) is a 
synthetic, psychoactive drug used illegally as a recreational drug. It is neurotoxic and 
reported to produce a syntonic and empathic effect among and between individuals 
19 
 
under its influence. No studies could be found linking the drug to the shared manifold of 
intersubjectivity to date.  
Collective Resonance Theory  
 Levi (2005) describes collective resonance as “a felt sense of energy, rhythm, or 
intuitive knowing that occurs in a group of human beings and positively affects the way 
they interact toward a common purpose” (p. 21). Working with a diversity of participants 
and group contexts, Levi discovered a number of experiential phenomena that indicated 
the presence of biophysical rhythm entrainment [which matches the signature of 
intersubjectivity], and nine shifting factors that each worked at different energetic, 
physical, emotional, spiritual and intellectual levels to shift the group into a felt collective 
resonance. They are: “vulnerability, silence, story, place/space, container contraction, 
shared intention, truth, sound/vibration, and spirit” (p. 23).  
Summation 1 
 This survey of thought on intersubjectivity points to its primary sources of 
ontology. Most first order derivative use of intersubjectivity—as with Habermas, Blumer, 
Gallese, and Coelho and Figueiredo—is largely predicated on the independent and 
synchronous epistemes of Buber, Husserl, and, or Mead that find intersubjectivity as 
constituting of identity and knowledge. Inchoate biophysical theories appear to align 
with the philosophical, phenomenological, and psychological theories described, to form 
potentially useful schema for adaption of dialogue to intentionally modulate 
intersubjective fields. The most salient impression here is the continuity and lack of 




Socrates and Plato 
 The earliest form of dialogue associated with this incipient dialectic with 
intersubjectivity is the elenctic dialogue of Socrates otherwise known as the Socratic 
method of ethical inquiry as portrayed in Plato's Dialogues (Hamilton & Cairns, 1969). 
The underlying purpose of the Dialogues is to educe moral accountability to the polis 
with a process of answering questions with more questions that invite the interlocutor to 
examine their anteceding premises. Socrates’ use of the elenchus was intended to 
expedite the discovery of an interlocutor’s predications and inconsistencies. As effective 
of a learning tool the elenchus was, it had the unintended consequence of humiliating 
those who wanted to be seen as knowledgeable. This Argyrisian (see Argyris, 1993) 
defensive routine led to Socrates’ death sentence.  
A modern and less threatening use of Socratic dialogue, which originated with 
the work of philosopher Leonard Nelson (1882-1927) is used to find specific answers to 
singular questions—often ethical in nature. It requires the participation of a facilitator 
trained in rhetoric and argumentation, and the goal is to arrive at consensus about a 
specific issue or problem among a small group (Bolton, 2001).  
Bohm 
Bohm (1996) identified the principal elements of modern dialogue and began a 
surge of interest in its utility beginning in 1970. Bohm conceived a multi-faceted 
dialogical worldview that encompassed a wide array of human experience.  On its 
superficial level, dialogue is seen as a process of creating meaning among individuals in 
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a group. As members of such a group become sensitive to or aware of each other’s 
assumptions, the phenomena of shared new meaning unfolds.  
"Dialogue comes from the Greek word dialogos. Logos means "the word," or in 
our case we would think of the "meaning of the word." And dia means 
"through”—it doesn't mean "two." . . . This derivation suggests…a stream of 
meaning flowing among, and through, and between us. (Bohm, 1996, p. 6) 
This understanding of the term dialogue2 excludes the alternative definitions as a literary 
form and that of the technological form as in ‘dialogue box.’  
A brief excerpt from On Dialogue (Bohm, 1996) captures the essential dynamic 
of Bohmian dialogue: 
In dialogue, when one person says something, the other person does not in 
general respond with exactly the same meaning as that seen by the first person. 
Rather, the meanings are only similar and not identical. Thus, when the second 
person replies, the first person sees a difference between what he meant and 
what the other person understood. On considering this difference, he may then 
be able to see something new, which is relevant both to his own views, and to 
those of the other person. And so it can go back and forth, with the continual 
emergence of a new content that is common to both participants. Thus . . . each 
person does not attempt to make common certain ideas or items of information 
that are already known to him. Rather it may be said that the two people are 
making something in common, i.e., creating something new together. (p. 2) 
                                            
2  Variations of the term ‘dialogue’ germane to this discussion (in the sense of verbal exchange of thought 
between two or more persons) from the Oxford English Dictionary Online (2004) include dialogic, 
dialogical, dialogism, dialogist, dialogistic, dialogistical, dialogistically, dialogize, dialogous (rare), dialogue 
de sourds, dialoguer (rare), and dialoguize (obsolete). 
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Bohm (1996) brought to the forefront this idea of emerging new content at a time 
when most interpretations of dialogue were narrowly focused. As with Socrates, shared 
consciousness of underlying impediments to authentic communication is the first priority 
of Bohm’s process as described by his editor, Lee Nichol: 
...dialogue is aimed at the understanding of consciousness per se, as well as 
exploring the problematic nature of day-to-day relationship and communication. 
This definition provides a foundation, a reference point . . . for the key 
components of dialogue: shared meaning; the nature of collective thought; the 
pervasiveness of fragmentation; the function of awareness; the microcultural 
context; undirected inquiry; impersonal fellowship; and the paradox of the 
observer and the observed. (Bohm, 1996, p. xi, Editor's Forward)  
Chris Argyris, as cited by Kurtzman (1998), speaks of discussions wherein 
participants engage in conversations that take place on an “espoused theory” level, and 
never acknowledge their actual “theories in use” (p. 1). These defensive routines can be 
exacerbated with personal inferential assumptions that paralyze the group’s ability to 
create authentic meaning or knowledge for action (Argyris, 1993). Bohm’s approach to 
such gridlock is to use it to confront the need to trace the thinking that led to the freezing 
in place of the espoused theory which he calls assumptions. “. . . dialogue has to go into 
all the pressures that are behind our assumptions. It goes into the process of thought 
behind the assumptions” (Bohm, 1996, p. 9). These assumptions are often constructs 
from another time and purpose that need shared reflection to realign with current reality.  
Experience has shown that if . . . a group continues to meet regularly, social 
conventions begin to wear thin, and the content of sub-cultural differences begins 
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to assert itself, regardless of the topic du jour. This emergent friction between 
contrasting values is at the heart of dialogue, in that it allows the participants to 
notice the assumptions that are active in the group, including one's own personal 
assumptions. Recognizing the power of these assumptions and attending to their 
‘virus-like’ nature may lead to a new understanding of the fragmentary and self-
destructive nature of many of our thought processes. With such understanding, 
defensive posturing can diminish, and a quality of natural warmth and fellowship 
can infuse the group. (Bohm, 1996, p. ix, Editor's Forward) 
Individuals build high value around fragmentary constructs, and reify and defend 
them because they accumulate so much at stake in their validity; and walking away 
from them alone is uncharted ground. It’s as if the constructs are snapshots of a 
changing landscape that gradually lose their utility as maps. 
One of [the] difficulties [of thinking] is fragmentation which originates in thought—
it is thought which divides everything up. Every division we make is a result of 
how we think. In actuality, the whole world is shades merging into one. But we 
select certain things and separate them from others—for convenience at first. 
Later we give this separation great importance. We set up separate nations, 
which are entirely the result of our thinking, and then we begin to give them 
supreme importance. We also divide religions by thought—separate religions are 
entirely a result of how we think. (Bohm, 1996, p. 9) 
In On Dialogue, Bohm spoke of the dialogic process in its purest form as 
conducted without specific outcome goals and as topically unlimited discourse to 
generate shared meaning—not specific answers to predetermined questions. Bohm 
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however did make the case for a limited form of dialogue, as applied to the business 
case, where a dialogic approach to problems can be useful if sensitivity is maintained. 
Bohm is clear in identifying personal assumptions as the primary barrier to 
shared meaning through dialogue. Those assumptions are developed from one's 
cultural ground and the chunking or snapshots taken at other times for other purposes. 
Sensitivity during the dialogic process is the key to getting behind the thinking that 
produced the assumptions that block the creation of shared meaning. New meaning to 
an individual doesn't directly benefit society, but shared new meaning can.   
So sensitivity involves the senses, and also something beyond. The senses are 
sensitive to certain things to which they respond, but that's not enough. The 
senses will tell you what is happening, and then the consciousness must build a 
form, or create some sense of what it means, which holds it together. Therefore 
meaning is part of it. You are sensitive to the meaning, or to the lack of meaning. 
It's perception of meaning if you want to put it that way. In other words it is a 
more subtle perception. The meaning is what holds it together. As I said, it is the 
"cement." Meaning is not static—it is flowing. And if we have the meaning being 
shared, then it is flowing among us; it holds the group together. Then everybody 
is sensitive to all the nuances going around, not merely to what is happening in 
his own mind. From that forms a meaning which is shared. And in that way we 
can talk together coherently and think together. Whereas generally people hold 





Bakhtin and Vygotsky 
There are two camps on dialogue; “those who idealize dialogue as mutual action 
including but . . . transcending ordinary discourse and dialectics, and [those who darkly] 
see dialogue as essentially examinatory and inquisitorial” (Fogel, 1996, p. 1). Bakhtin 
explored the dark side of dialogue he calls a “dialogeme” (p. 2) of forced or coerced 
dialogue as seen in Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannos.  
Cheyne and Tarulli (1999) interpret the work of Bakhtin and Vygotsky to deduce 
three genres of dialogue to be found within and defined by Vygotsky’s zone of proximal 
development (ZPD) when mediated by the polis. Vygotsky defined the ZPD as “the 
distance between [one’s] actual developmental level as determined by independent 
problem solving and [one’s] level of potential development as determined through 
problem solving . . . in collaboration with more capable peers” (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 86). 
The three genres of dialogue introduced are “Magistral dialogue: the authoritative other” 
(p. 11), “Socratic dialogue: the questioning other” (p. 12), and “Menippean dialogue: 
carnival, [de-construction, misbehavior, etc.]” (p. 14). Each genre can be seen as 
different phases of the ZPD with social forces always pulling back toward Magistral 
oppression with a third voice.  
Vygotsky (1978) originally proposed the ZPD as a way to explain the dialectical 
relationship between learning and development among children. 
We propose that an essential feature of learning is that it creates the zone of 
proximal development; that is, learning awakens a variety of internal 
developmental processes that are able to operate only when the child is 
interacting with people in his environment and in cooperation with his peers. 
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Once these processes are internalized, they become part of the child’s 
independent developmental achievement. (p. 90)  
The use of the ZPD model has expanded to adult learning and development and has 
positive implications for workgroups. In practice it is the dialectic “between changing 
social conditions and the biological substrata of behavior” (p. 123).  
 Bakhtin (as cited in Zappen, 2000) brought a strong sense of context to his work 
in understanding the dialogical life in the literary characters of Dostoyevsky and 
Rabelais. Bakhtin reflected that “‘to be means to communicate’ and ‘life by its very 
nature is dialogic’” (p. 3). He distinguishes a sentence as described linguistically from 
utterance which correlates directly with the “‘extraverbal context of reality (situation, 
setting, prehistory)’ and with the utterances of other speakers” (p. 3). One is reminded 
here of Karl Mannheim’s idea of situation-bound meaning (Berman, 1981). Bakhtin 
discerns three different aspects of the dialogic relationship of utterances as a complex 
unity of differences—differences in the dyad and differences in the changing self. They 
are named polyphony, heteroglossia, and carnival.  
Bakhtin found the characters in Dostoyevsky’s polyphonic novels to be 
constituted by their interactions with each other and the reader. Dostoyevsky did not 
describe the characters for the reader, because the words and actions of the characters 
did—for each other and the reader. Bakhtin sees this as a parallel authentic way that 
people come to develop and know themselves—through their exchange of utterances 
with one another. The greater the number of actors and exchanges, the richer the 
development of the self.  
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Heteroglossia describes speech styles in a language but Bakhtin extends it to “a 
complex mixture of languages and world views that is . . . dialogized, as each language 
is viewed from the perspective of others” (p. 6). This dialogized heteroglossia leads to 
hybridization of the languages which brings new meanings together and enriches 
development of each actor.  
Bakhtin finds in Rabelais a way of life and mode of language he calls carnival 
which is a complete immersion in “freedom from official norms and values, ‘a special 
type of communication impossible in everyday life’” (Zappen, 2000). Whereas 
heteroglossia seems supplemental to polyphony in human development, carnival seems 
like the back side of the same coin—one being the constructive Apollonian side, and the 
other a darker, earthier Bacchanalian side toward which one can turn to the exclusion of 
the other.  
Appreciative Inquiry 
 Cooperrider and Srivastva (1987) steered action research away from its 
“pervasive deficiency / problem orientation” (p. 24) toward a generative model of 
appreciative inquiry (AI) founded on four principles. They state that “research into the 
social potential of organizational life should [1] begin with appreciation, [2] . . . be 
applicable [3] . . . be provocative, [and 4] . . . be collaborative” (p. 27). “Much of the 
theory, implicit and explicit, behind the effects of AI focuses on the bonding, healing and 
enlivening qualities of appreciative dialogue on social relations” (Bushe, 2001, p. 11). A 
salient feature of AI is that it is a meaning making process that is effective with “both 
synchronous and asynchronous interactions” (Stamps & Lipnack, 2004, p. 31) thereby 
preserving integrity of distributed teams.  
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The aims of Bohmian dialogue and AI are powerfully aligned. Whereas dialogue 
initiates an arising of consciousness between interlocutors with its inquiry and 
suspension of judgment to understand the other and to co-create new meaning, AI 
takes that new meaning in a positive direction through narrative wholeness, to 
organizational consciousness, and ultimately to global-well being (Whitney, 2004).  
Thatchenkery (2004) introduces the concept of hermeneutic appreciation to 
reframe the basic organizational propensity to expend energy solving paradoxes by 
embracing and using them as a generative force. The German word Weltanschauung 
unifies perception of reality with experience of the world in language to create “an 
inseparability of interpretation from experience” (p. 81). The generative opportunities of 
this method are lost to workgroups persisting with deficit orientation. 
Autopoietic Theory  
 Humberto Maturano “considers language as a coupling activity based on the 
establishment of consensuality between recursive interactions among self and others” 
(Sekerka & McCraty, 2004, p. 221). As with Husserl’s streaming, living present, each 
instant of our reality is constituted by cognitive and biological interactions within and 
between the poles of each dyad, with each being structurally changed as evidenced by 
affect, behavior, acquisition of knowledge, and creation of new meaning.  “We literally 
create the world we live in by living it” (Sekerka & McCraty, 2004, p. 221, quoting 
Maturano).  
Sekerka and McCraty (2004) assert that one’s entire biological system baselines 
to normative patterns of experience, and immediately adjusts to perturbations or new 
unfamiliar patterns of input.  
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Once a stable baseline pattern . . . is established, the neural systems attempt to 
maintain a match between the baseline pattern and current inputs and the 
outcomes of projected future behaviors. If the baseline pattern becomes 
maladapted, the system will still strive to maintain a match to that pattern, even 
though it is not in our best interest (p. 226). 
This may provide a window for understanding the significance of breathing techniques 
in controlling emotions during dialogue. The biophysical platform for pattern matching 
may have implications for intensities of the dialogical container and intersubjective field 
of each instantiation of personal interaction in its ever changing context.  
Wittgensteinian Language-Games and Batesonian Metalogues 
 Shotter and Katz (1999, citing Anderson) discusses the “very crucial . . . 
momentary, bodily ‘moving,’ not-easily-picturable, ‘living’ nature of our conversational 
practices” (p. 4). Drawing from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, they say that 
what we apprehend in our interactions with people and phenomena is an embodied way 
of acting in relation to them.  
To compare one apprehension to another for difference and understanding we 
must not look to “static pictures, nor in fixed inner mental representations or 
ideas, but in the moving, momentary dialogic, living relationships that occur in the 
streams of life between us (p. 5). 
This concept resonates with Husserl’s temporal sedimentations and ‘streaming, living 
present’ which took him from static to generative phenomenology (via passive and 
active synthesis).  
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 Wittgenstein (Shotter, 1995) does not address the outcomes of dialogic process, 
but is concerned how we come to agreement on those outcomes and can be assured 
we lay the foundation to speak coherently in each situated context. Wittgenstein argues 
that instead of turning immediately to a study of how individuals come to know 
the objects and entities in the world around them, we should begin in a quite 
different way: by studying how, by interweaving our talk in with our other actions 
and activities, we first develop and sustain between us, different particular ways 
of relating ourselves to each other—that is, that we should first study . . . our 
different forms of life with their associated language-games (p. 3, citing Gergen). 
Wittgenstein urges us to examine the poetics of our moment-to-moment circumstances 
and interactions in praxis, and to avoid using static theories and historical schemas as 
guides for interpretation of ever changing “momentary relational encounters” (p. 2).  
Each language-game is generatively constituted with words colored with the situated 
context of actions and circumstances. The objective is to attend to the tone of the words 
and the lacuna between them, to “follow or grasp the tendencies in each other’s 
conduct“ (p. 3) in a way that maintains sense-making relationships and finds those 
circumstances for “being able to go on with each other in practice” (p. 3). This appears 
very similar to what Issacs (1999) would call attending to the container, and what Bohm 
would call protecting the conversations from fragmentation.  
 Shotter (1995) extracts from Wittgenstein a number of reminders for gaining 
understanding of how to draw attention to how we draw attention to things: 
(i) of the ‘gestural’ nature of our practical, embodied understandings; (ii) of our 
concern with the tensions, the struggles, and the ambiguities at work in the gaps 
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between us; (iii) of the possibility of us constructing new relations between us 
from the resources available to us in such gaps; and (iv) of our concern with how, 
in the making of such new connections and relations, we are projecting various, 
possibly new, forms of life (p. 5). 
The process is remarkably well demonstrated in Bateson’s (1972) Metalogues (pp. 3-
58). Bateson defines a metalogue as a conversation about a problematic subject in 
which the participants discuss both the problem and the structure of the conversation 
simultaneously.  
 Wittgenstein (2001) is consonant with Bohm’s later expressions on dialogue as 
when one is shown alternate circumstantial possibilities a person is “now . . . inclined to 
regard a given case differently: that is, to compare it with this rather than that set of 
pictures. I have changed his way of looking at a thing” (1953, no. 144). 
Issacs’ Dialogic Container and Fields of Conversation 
  Issacs (1999) cites Bohm as the first to compare conversation with the field 
behavior of a superconductor. The field of conversation is constituted with the 
memories, feelings, and history of the participants. This field is the intersubjective field if 
only for an isolated conversation. As more people join the conversation and interact in 
common time and space, that field becomes modulated with experiential feedback on 
many levels. The intersubjective field is that part of the dialogical container that 
passively carries forward, whereas there are many ways the container can be actively 
enhanced to enrich the field and produce a variety of positive outcomes such as 
innovations and new knowledge. As Issacs says, “we cannot manufacture a field . . . 
you cannot work on a field” because the field always exists as a natural exchange of 
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human energy. Intentionality is to be directed to creating the container “in which the 
intensities of human activity can safely emerge” (p. 242) and that will serve as an 
attractor to a healthy (intersubjective) field.  
 Issacs (1999) offers four practices that are elemental to the container: listening, 
respecting one another, suspending judgments, and speaking one’s own voice. 
“Dialogue sets out to clarify and explain the container in which a conversation might 
take place . . . no consciously held container, no dialogue” (p. 244). Citing Pearce, 
Issacs suggests that for growth to occur in the container, “energy, possibility, and 
safety” (p. 244) must be evident and assured.  
 Isaacs (1999) also describes what he and C. Otto Scharmer name the Four 
Fields of Conversation which are the four stages of group development to fully 
generative dialogue. In Field 1, when a group first meets to converse, there is no 
container and politeness is carried to extremes to avoid discomfort. Any process 
reflection can raise defensive feeling. Keeping personal dignity and saving face are 
primary and contributions are monological. Field 2 is an uncomfortable place where, 
through facilitation or skillful conversation, people’s ideas are challenged or 
contextualized, sending some into retreat to field 1 and possibly leading to overall 
dialogical breakdown. Many groups cannot move beyond this point and remain 
fragmented. Field 3 is where a group moves into reflection and begins using inquiry3 as 
a means of finding some new meaning together, and field 4 is where the group is in flow 
with generative dialogue and maintaining a very stable container. At this place there is 
an “awareness of the primacy of the whole . . . and people generate new rules for 
                                            
3 There are several styles of inquiry that may be suitable here: simple Bohmian inquiry, Action inquiry, 
and Appreciative inquiry. 
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interaction” (p. 279).  This series of fields is not unlike Tuckman’s four stages of group 
formation: forming, storming, norming, and performing. 
Interreligious and Interideological Dialogue 
 Leonard Swidler has for many decades convened and edited voices around the 
world on the matter of dialogue among Muslims, Christians, Jews, and Hindi. Among his 
prolific writings he published a decalogue of ground rules for interreligious and 
interideological dialogue (see Appendix). Swidler (1992) describes the approach to 
dialogue between people and groups of differing religions and ideologies as requiring a 
dialogical learning attitude and avoiding a monological teaching attitude. The signature 
challenge of these dialogues has been the absolutism each group reveres for its 
traditions. Swidler (Sahadat, 1997) cautions against allowing dialogue in this realm 
becoming “polemical or dialectical [because] the former functions on the basis of 
confrontation and refutation and the later [functions] on the basis of systematic 
reasoning for the juxtaposition of opposing views” (p. 1). Debate nor forced change 
have no place here either. “The fundamental goal . . . is for partners in dialogue to learn 
from one another, understand, grow, and change for the better. Patience, courtesy, and 
the ability to listen attentively with an open mind [is] helpful in this process” (p. 1).  
 Two prominent issues of religious pluralism (Sahadat, 1997) are “different 
apprehensions, interpretations, and expressions of truth [and that] there is not one 
exclusive way to liberation from the human condition” (p. 1-2) to reconcile soderologies. 
Swidler points to two reasons why so many of the religious cannot accept the truths and 
means of salvation of other faith traditions: because they believe God has revealed 
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himself exclusively to their own tradition, and because their model of truth is absolute, 
static, and exclusive. Küng (1992) offers a more detailed description of this perspective: 
Every religion has its problematic point, a crucial point that seems to be 
indisputable, not negotiable, and which is the main difficulty for the others. For 
Christians, this point is Christology, that Jesus is the Son of God. For Jews, it is 
the promise that Israel, with its land, is the People of God. For Muslims, it is the 
Qur’an as the Word of God-Son of God, People of God, Word of God (p. 272). 
  Swidler (Sahadat, 1997) contends we must shift to a relational model of truth that 
is deabsolutized in the manner of the Jain4 anekintavada tradition that accepts many 
paths to the truth and “states that contrary alternatives can be true from different 
standpoints” (p. 3). This epistemological relationality in the Swidlerian model links truths 
with the contextualized reality of each speaker-knower. “Relationality and mutuality are 
at the very foundation of this new model of truth and they point ineluctably to the need 
for dialogue” (p. 4).  
 The texts abound with enlightened Muslim intellectuals striving for dialogue 
among world religions. A rich excerpt from al Faruqi’s (1992, p. 9) paper Islam and 
Christianity: Diatribe or Dialogue , originally published in the Journal of Ecumenical 
Studies in 1968 is one of the more powerful pre-quantum descriptions of dialogue.  
Dialogue is education at its widest and noblest. It is the fulfillment of the 
command of reality to become known, to be compared and contrasted with other 
                                            
4 Jainism (Sahadat, 1997) which dates back to the sixth century B.C.E. is a non-theistic Indian religion 
that offers a timely contribution to dialogue through its model of truth, fundamental to which is 
anekintavada: nonabsolutization or many-sidedness. This theory states that reality is complex with infinite 
sides or aspects, all of which can never be known through either the various categories of thought or 
sense perception or both (p. 4). The Jain theory of many-sidedness presupposes a manifold number of 
viewpoints (p. 5) . . . hence, the true nature [of a thing] will always be beyond our grasp (p. 6). The 
fundamental principle in Jain ethics, nonviolence (ahimsa), is an excellent complement to Swidler’s 
ground rules for dialogue (p. 9). 
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claims, to be acquiesced in if true, amended if inadequate, and rejected if false. 
Dialogue is the removal of all barriers between men for a free intercourse of 
ideas where the categorical imperative is to let the sounder claim to the truth win. 
Dialogue disciplines our consciousness to recognize the truth inherent in realities 
and figurizations of realities beyond our usual ken and reach. If we are not 
fanatics, the consequence can-not be anything but enrichment to all concerned. 
Dialogue, in short, is the only kind of inter-human relationship worthy of man! 
 Swidler also points to other prominent Muslim thought leaders who focus on the 
contextual matters preceding good dialogue. Duran (1992) discusses the Muslim 
diasporas and contrasts the hijra5 to modern economic dislocations. Modern day Muslim 
laborers in Europe are somewhat estranged from the ancient practice of discerning dar 
al-islam6 from dar al-harb7—a Manichean division of the world from early Islamic law— 
and alienated in their foreign cultures and unable to assimilate them because of their 
low economic status. “Many view their sojourn in a non-Muslim society as a temporary 
necessity and long to return to sources of purity that become more and more imaginary” 
(p. 99). One can imagine the challenge of initiating meaningful dialogue with and among 
such populations who are fragmented in their understanding of their faith, economically 
disenfranchised, lacking in political agency, and dreaming of an earthly future that 
doesn’t exist. “The increasing inter-penetration of different national societies and 
religious communities has created new conditions that make . . . reciprocity [between 
them] incumbent upon communities less and less homogeneous” (p. 109).  
                                            
5 Historically the hijra was a mass migration from lands not tolerant of Muslim religious practice (dar al-
islam) to places where one’s religion could be practiced freely (dar al-harb).   
6 The dar al-islam is an envisioning of an “abode of peace.”  
7 The dar al-harb is an envisioning of an “abode of war. “  
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This is, by extension, a compelling case for workgroups, however hysteretic 
patterns are difficult for cultures to ignore as in cases of past efforts at dialogue 
“sometimes misunderstood by Muslims as a masked attempt at syncretism—[a 
suspicion] not always without basis” (Askari, 1992, p. 37). Ironically, dialogue practiced 
in authentic relationships is the only tool with which to untangle such deeply embedded 
misunderstandings among the myriad religious cultures, some of which are themselves 
changing, and so many which are disparate in knowledge.  
This problem of education is perhaps addressed by Hassan (1992) in a 
discussion of Hindu-Muslim ‘dialogue of life’ which she describes as not “contrived” and 
emerging from the daily processes of living (p. 405). “There is a great need today to 
make ‘dialogue from above’ coalesce with ‘dialogue from below’” (p. 406) which is to 
say that both the academic dialogue (i.e. Bohmian) and the everyday discourse of 
people interacting and negotiating with each other go hand in hand to resolving the 
more existential problems between them.  
Summation 2 
 The art of dialogue has a number of original thinkers like Socrates, Buber, Bohm, 
and Wittgenstein who point the way for the substantive work of Issacs and Maturano. 
Their combined work helps bring to focus new relevance for other threads of inquiry as 
those of Bakhtin, Vygotsky, and Cooperrider attest. Along the way, practitioners like 
Swidler accumulate and reflect on methodologies used to make dialogue effective in 
difficult circumstances. This bricolage of knowledge and wisdom provides permutations 
of opportunity to craft innovative dialogical solutions to the needs of human enterprise.  
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Postmodern Collaborative Workgroups 
 Workgroups positioned in hierarchical command-and-control oriented 
organizations are constrained by directives, micromanagement, and the metaphors of 
superior layers of management. This precludes unrestrained meaning-making through 
dialogue because expressions must to some degree align to the egoistic and political 
pall over the intersubjective space. It is for this reason that the better locus for the 
dialogic container is found in emergent, postmodern organizations, or once-positivist 
organizations intentionally transforming toward the relational quantum paradigm. That 
new paradigm has brought forth the awareness that particles do not tend to exist except 
in relationship with others, and the same can be said for the self in relationship with 
others (Wheatley, 1999). As Martin Luther King said: “We are entangled in a web of 
mutuality.” The quality of our actions is predicated on the quality or nature of our 
relationships.  
Group Formation  
Katzenbach & Smith (1993) set the direction for development of workgroups into 
high performance teams with the following set of eight common approaches that—albeit 
unintentionally—lends well to the behavioral framework for fully intersubjective dialogue, 
as indicated in brackets:  
1. Establish urgency and direction. [A natural sense of urgency—not externally 
imposed time-result pressure—stemming from the revelations can serve like 
a stochastic resonance reinforcing the contextual orientation. General 
direction at the outset of dialogue prevents non sequitur.] 
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2. Select members based on skills and skill potential, not personalities. [Similar 
personalities can conceivably reduce diversity of creative thought, whereas 
polarity can be dialogically fruitful.] 
3. Pay particular attention to first meetings and actions. [Expectations are best 
set early in the dialogic process to cement the group in uncontaminated unity 
of purpose.] 
4. Set some clear rules of behavior [i.e. balancing advocacy and inquiry 
(Argyris, 1993)]. 
5. Set and seize upon a few immediate performance-oriented tasks and goals 
[—the topical part of the dialogue container]. 
6. Challenge the group regularly with fresh facts and information [—providing 
waves of opportunity for double-loop and triple-loop learning]. 
7. Spend lots of time together [—one of Bohm’s essential requirements for 
surfacing assumptions and thereby generating sensitivity]. 
8. Exploit the power of positive feedback, recognition, and reward. 
[Paraphrasing, validating, encouraging all lead to increased mutuality, 
generative dialog, and new shared meaning.] (pp. 119-127) 
A good team intentionally learns to coordinate these actions to lay the 
groundwork for the dialogic container. William Issacs (1999) likens a successful team or 
workgroup using dialogue to an improvisational jazz group that creates new music 
simply by interacting with their unique skills and idioms within an intersubjective space. 
McCullough (2005) attributes America’s historically great accomplishments to its 
peoples’ unique ability to improvise [and one might add its diversity]. There are many 
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layers of scholarship to be reviewed in the literature, such as for example the caveat of 
Brown, Tumeo, Larey and Paulus (1998) regarding the negative effects of expressing 
feelings and emotion in brainstorming sessions. A term Illich (1973) introduced is 
conviviality to mean “autonomous and creative intercourse among persons” and 
“individual freedom realized in personal interdependence” (p. 11).  As society moves 
into the post-industrial era, Illich theorized that industrial productivity and professional 
services will quickly fall short of helping people with their authentic needs.  
Illich’s prescience is playing out in communities and organizations at an alarming 
rate. To forestall this trend we may consider the following theories and methods as 
adjunctive to the maintenance and positive attenuation of each dialogic container and its 
surrounding intersubjective field within workgroups and networks.  
Group Decision Making 
The value of group decision making over individual decision making is apparent 
in the literature on dialogue.  There is a natural propensity for individuals to offer 
solutions and advice from their own experiential background and referential framework.  
As limited or expansive as that might be, the testing of one’s ideas alongside those of 
others in a group provides an opportunity for creative insight for each party that 
transcends the initial ideas offered.  That synergy can also be used to refine the 
individual’s offering to become more germane to the specific topic or problem at hand 
or, alternatively, to set a valid new direction or goal based on resulting revelations.  This 
is an efficacious approach a group can take for outside-the-box solutions.  
Occasionally we don’t hear the actual words that are being spoken because we 
substitute the words that we’re expecting to hear from another party.  In responding, we 
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will reference the words we thought we heard only to find ourselves off track with the 
other’s intentions.  Also we may find that although we may be discussing the same 
topic, the other may be approaching it from an entirely different frame of reference. 
Recalling Bohm’s (1996) explanation that what one person says is not exactly 
responded to by another in the way it is meant, an “other” sees that slight difference to 
generate a new perspective on their preconception.  This process brings the “tacit 
infrastructure” (Bohm, 1985) of thought to the surface. If this happens reciprocally 
among several people with diverse backgrounds, the ideation is enriched.  If the 
elements of the interpersonal process which include active listening and clarifying, 
supporting and building, along with confronting and differing are skillfully engaged in this 
enriched discussion; the outcome can be very fruitful.  
Action Theory (as a dialogical platform and mutuality generator) 
 Argyris (1993) developed action science for effective stewardship in any group or 
organization. Used as a framework for learning, it enables groups to become resilient to 
external changes. Values are fundamental in explaining action theory. 
Theories of action are governed by a set of values that provide the framework for 
the action strategies chosen. Thus, human beings are designing beings. They 
create, store, and retrieve designs that advise them how to act if they are to 
achieve their intentions and act consistently with their governing values. These 
designs are key to understanding human action. (p. 50) 
Argyris (1993) has developed two action models for organizational limited-
learning systems that pivot on the potential embarrassment attached to actions.  
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Model 1 tells individuals to craft their positions, evaluations, and attributions in 
ways that inhibit inquiries into them and tests of them with others’ logic. The 
consequences . . . are likely to be defensiveness, misunderstanding, and self-
fulfilling and self-sealing processes. (p. 52)  
Model 2 behaviors are crafted into action strategies that openly illustrate 
how the actors [reach] their evaluations or attributions and how they [craft] them 
to encourage inquiry and testing by others. As a consequence, defensive 
routines that are anti-learning are minimized and double loop learning is 
facilitated. (p. 55, citing Argyris & Schön)  
The process of intentionally engaging action science on the Model 2 level 
produces trust in the actions taken and, by default, in the people executing them. This 
trust is vital to each dialogical container in which healthy, ethical transactions occur. The 
intersubjective field of that container is enlarged with the confidence that exchanges are 
reliable; and authentic learning and growth are present upon which to build.  
Specific practices of identifying defensive routines and avoidance of escalating 
inferential presumption support a healthy dialogic culture. Defensive routines (Argyris, 
1993, Argyris, & Schön, 1996) can be discerned through conversational patterns using 
Argyris’ “left-hand column method” (Argyris, Putnam & McLain Smith, 1985) of 
annotation. Inferential presumption is tested by analyzing his “ladder-of-inference” as 
described by its rungs: 
1. Experience Some Relatively Directly Observable Data - Listen to a recorded 
conversation, not merely to what he, she, or they recall was said. 
2. Impose Meanings on Conversation - "The meaning of the conversation is...." 
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3. Impose Meanings on Actions - "The intention the person had in taking the 
action was....’ 
4. Evaluate an action – ‘The action was effective or not.’ (Action, 2005)  
The original author of action science, action research, and more recently action 
inquiry, Torbert (2004), describes action inquiry as a kind of behavior that “is 
simultaneously productive and self assessing . . . listens into the developing situation . . 
accomplishes whatever tasks appear to have priority . . . invites a revisioning . . . if 
necessary . . . is always a timely discipline . . . because its purpose is . . . to discover . . 
what action is timely” (p. 13). 
 Fundamental to action inquiry is what Torbert (2004) names “super-vision” which 
is achieved through the systems theory process of triple-loop feedback within each 
person’s awareness to generate and maintain mutuality within a group.  He reveals that 
there are three nested levels of feedback that constitute triple-loop feedback. Single-
loop feedback acceptance leads to change in behaviors and operations; this is the 
deepest level of acceptance most people tolerate to one extent or another. Double-loop 
feedback acceptance can lead to change in structure, strategy, and action-logic but it is 
difficult to accept because of the propensity for strong self-identity with these constructs. 
It requires the pull of a deeper spiritual sense of presence, attention, intention, and 
vision found in triple-loop feedback to move one out of this self-identity anchoring, to full 
acceptance of changes required in structure, strategy, and action-logic, and to acquire 
super-vision and the ability to lead others in mutuality to such actions. “Triple-loop 
feedback makes us present to ourselves now” (p. 18).   
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 Correlating to the levels of feedback are territories of experience and parts of 
speech that facilitate the acquisition of triple-loop feedback. The first two territories of 
experience Torbert (2004) names “outside events” and “own sense of performance” 
which are the actions and the behavioral responses of others and self respectively. 
These correspond to single-loop feedback. Torbert’s third territory of experience is 
“action-logics” which are the schemas and experiential modes of reflection that can 
educe double-loop feedback. The fourth territory named “intentional attention,” is the 
rarified field of presencing awareness, vision, and intuition that confirms the second-
loop response-actions by generating confidence and mutuality among immediate 
others. Moment-to-moment reflection on this plane of awareness generates triple-loop 
feedback (p. 22). 
 Torbert’s (2004) four corresponding styles of speech that draw timely content 
from the four territories of experience are: “inquiring and listening [to] outcomes in the 
external world . . . illustrating behaviors [and] operations . . . advocating strategy and 
structure [and] goals . . . [and corresponding to triple-loop super-vision] framing of 
attention [and] intention [and] vision” (p. 30). The “interweaving [of] first- [objective], 
second- [intersubjective], and third-person [objective] action-inquiry” (p. 219) can 
generate transformation in any community of practice. 
Group Problem Solving Processes (as platforms for intersubjectivity) 
Collaborative business process models and methodologies abound and many in 
and of themselves require individual and group attention to discipline akin to the 
principles of dialogical process to be at all effective. In this sense the models and 
methods, as tools, may recursively reinforce healthy intersubjective fields.  
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 The Osborne-Parnes Creative  Problem Solving (CPS) process is the product of 
Parnes’ extension of Osborne’s work on creative problem solving methods. The process 
draws participants through a combination of convergent and divergent thinking tools—to 
avoid only singular solutions that have worked before—to generate multiple fresh 
solutions. CSP uses six steps of inquiry named mess-finding, data-finding, problem-
finding, idea-finding, solution-finding, and acceptance-finding. Elements of this process 
may have synergy with those of Altshuller’s  Ideation / TRIZ (I/T) innovation concepts 
and tools. The five focal elements of TRIZ are technical contradictions, physical 
contradictions, substance-fields, and Ideal Final Result (Hughes, 1998). The two 
models, coming from different cultures—American and Soviet respectively—
complement each other in vital ways and their confluence holds promise, not just for 
effective group innovation, but for providing a pathway that forms cohesion, shared 
purpose, and a platform for intersubjective engagement. Other models that have such 
implications are A. Buzan’s Mindmapping® methods as used in MindManager® software, 
and E. Goldratt’s project management based Theory of Constraints (TOC). It is reported 
“that TOC and TRIZ are being combined in Israel“ (Hughes, 1998, p. 11).  
Social Networks and Communities of Practice 
 A social network is a finite number of actors with common relationships, such as 
a workgroup or organization. Social network analysis is a mathematical method of 
determining the interdependent nature of those relationships and the centrality of 
specified attributes. Construction of network diagrams allows groups to understand how 
each person tends to fall into one of four roles (Cross & Parker, 2004):  
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central connectors, who have a disproportionate number of relations in the 
network and might be either unrecognized resources or bottlenecks; boundary 
spanners who connect a [group] with other [groups] or with similar networks in 
other organizations; information brokers, [who] communicate across sub-groups 
of an informal network so that the group as a whole won’t splinter . . . [and] 
peripheral people, who might either need help getting better connected or need 
space to operate on the fringes. (p. 71) 
Network analysis can be a powerful adjuvant to understanding  and focusing the 
dialogic container and sensing the intersubjective field because a diagram acts like a 
mirror with a macro view for groups and subgroups. Each member can graphically see 
his or her position in the relational network and is free to explore new connections 
toward wholeness of the group.  
The next evolutionary step for individual networks is formation of communities of 
practice (Wheatley, 2005). In the true sense of community, members are committed to 
mutual support and shared learning “to consciously develop new knowledge . . . [and] to 
advance the field of practice” (p. 177).  
Small Group Communication Theory 
 Beebe and Masterson (2003) illustrate the complexity of communication by listing 
the six persons represented in a dyadic conversation as:  
the person who you think you are, who you think the other person is, who you 
think the other person thinks you are, who the other person thinks he or she is, 
who the other person thinks you are, and who the other person thinks you think 
he or she is. (p. 38) 
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The permutation of this combination for a seven member group is 966 representations 
of identity to modify for uncertainty reduction on an unconscious level (p. 39, Table 2.1).  
Third person representations multiply that. Intentional cultivation of interpersonal 
relationships to an authentic level without dialogic inquiry can be a fruitless task.  
 Maslow’s theory of interpersonal needs (Beebe & Masterson, 2003) are arranged 
hierarchically in ascending order of physiological, safety, belongingness, esteem, and 
self-actualization. The theory assumes that higher level needs become manifest as 
lower level needs are fulfilled. If workgroups can provide a structure for this ascension 
of all its members, the intersubjective field and corresponding dialogic container are 
likely to be more generative. This theory has not been verified by research; however it 
may enhance the effectiveness of group work if members shared similar measures of 
ascension on this hierarchy for faster satisfaction, attunement of values, coherence, and 
reduction of anxiety.  
 Schutz’s theory of individual needs is also known as fundamental interpersonal 
relations orientation (FIRO) (Griffin, 1991). Beebe and Masterson (2003) list inclusion, 
control, and affection as primary sequential phases in the formation and interaction of a 
group. (In later expository on FIRO, Schutz replaced the term ‘affection’ with 
‘openness.’) Schutz uses the term ‘arena’ to describe the space in which group 
members’ needs become satisfied or frustrated. The arena can be seen as 
corresponding to the intersubjective field, with inclusion, control, and affection as 
conducive factors that are cyclical in the sense that “cohesiveness peaks during the 
affection phase” (p. 55) as goals are met. An helical cycle begins anew as the group 
reforms for each new phase or goal in linear progress toward its overall common 
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purpose. The satisfaction of affection needs is likely facilitated if not amplified by the 
syntonic nature of positive intersubjectivity within the group.  
Social Exchange Theory 
 Social exchange theory describes the balance of rewards and costs of belonging 
to groups and committing to the relationships within the group (Beebe & Masterson, 
2003). The success factors of the small group “such as cohesiveness and productivity  
are directly related to how rewarding the group experience is” (p. 40). Costs can include 
“mental effort, anxiety, or . . . embarrassment” (p. 39). Rewards can include “fellowship, 
job satisfaction, achievement, status, and meeting personal needs and goals” (p. 39). 
Such awards enhance the intensity of the intersubjective field of the group. Stemming 
from equity theory this is a deeply engrained social norm of quid pro quo wherein 
people are found to join and support the goals of a workgroup in some balanced 
measure with the fulfillment of their personal goals—as in the case of FIRO.  
 Systems theory, as applied to small groups, takes the perspective that 
workgroups and teams are open systems that receive input, process input, and yield 
output, and that exhibit properties of synergy, entropy, and equifinality. Systems theory 
can only trace the boundaries of small group process by revealing its broader context 
and external contingencies (Beebe & Masterson, 2003).  
Symbolic Convergence Theory 
 Ernest Borman’s symbolic convergence theory (Beebe & Masterson, 2003)  
explains how certain types of communication shape a group’s identity and 
culture, which in turn influence . . . norms, roles, and decision making . . . Group 
consciousness . . . evolves as group members share . . . creative and 
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imaginative shared interpretation of events that fulfills a group psychological or 
rhetorical need. (p. 42)  
As a group interacts, interpretations and beliefs tend to sediment with the group to 
become a shared identity carried forward into new interactions. “By describing how 
people in groups come to share a common social reality, symbolic convergence theory 
explains how groups make decisions and make sense of the decision making process 
(p. 43, citing Propp & Kreps). This learning propensity should be attended with 
dialogical reflection and caution for groupthink.  
Structuration Theory 
 Gidden’s structuration theory “suggests that when we join a new group, we use 
rules we learned in other groups to structure our behavior” (Beebe & Masterson, 2003, 
p. 44). This can act as a double edged sword in that the diversity of backgrounds brings 
optional and new rules to the group to enrich the containers, yet it sometimes brings 
dysfunctional rules that may need re-alignment to avoid fragmentation and useless 
perturbations.  
 Structuration theory treats structure and agency as a mutually dependent duality 
interacting in a helical cycle along a time-space axis. Its utility in the context of this 
paper is to remind us that in structuration theory, “structure is regarded as rules and 
resources recursively implicated in social reproduction” (Universiteit, 2004). The 
organizational structure of workgroups modulates the focal points, amplitude, and 
alignment of energy expended by its participants though situational rules, while 
fluctuation among participants and other resources gradually overcome homeostasis in 
Lewinian freeze-unfreeze-refreeze manner evidenced by occasional rule changes. 
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Persistent social structures and persistent situated actions (i.e. social practices, 
routines, etc.) essentially reproduce one another form structuration (Johnston, 2001). 
Functional Theory 
 Functional relationship exists where specific, intentional behavior produces 
desired, appropriate outcomes without unintended consequences. The positivist roots of 
functionalism are found in the scientific method. Functionalists largely look at outcomes 
after-the-fact to gauge their predictability based on the rules and controls that were in 
place during the interactions. This is an example of a model which would have little 
utility in the confluence of intersubjectivity and dialogue, because of its objective nature, 
but is useful for the maintenance of machines and chemical processes. 
Nonverbal behaviors and Non-behavioral Factors 
 Nonverbal behaviors in workgroups are critically important to understand 
because they are more universal and convey much more information than verbal 
expressions and utterances do, and thereby can negate or interfere with quality 
dialogue, or enhance it. Research continues to study the nonverbal communication 
system for its ambiguity, degrees of intentionality, levels of meaning, and cultural 
context (Byers, 1997).  
 Behavioral codes include kinesics (posturing, moving, gesturing), proxemics 
(personal space, territoriality), facial expressions and eye behavior (gaze), haptics 
(touch), and vocalics (pitch, rate, volume, paralanguage) (Beebe & Masterson, 2003; 
Verderber & Verderber, 1998; Byers, 1997). These behaviors are continuous during 
face to face conversations and exert enormous influence on the outcomes in extremely 
complex ways. Additional factors, not behavioral per se, also weigh in heavily. These 
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include dress, grooming, appearance, chronemics, and physical environment. These 
later factors are often attended to for optimization of business meetings, however often 
get overlooked with day-to-day workgroups.  
Open discussion of nonverbal behaviors in a trusting environment is another 
facet of the process theorists Torbert and Argyris promote to create alignment between 
the verbal, the nonverbal, and the action. Gestures and body language that don’t match 
the words are at best perplexing, and at worst destructive to coherent discourse and 
gainful enterprise. Studies assessing ability to interpret emotion and tone via email 
(Kruger, Epley, Parker & Ng, 2005) in the absence of gesture, emphasis, inflection and 
intonation demonstrated persistent overconfidence on the part of senders that intended 
humor and sarcasm were communicated. This points to the value of face-to-face 
venues for discourse. Although telephone and videoconferencing are respectively more 
marginally effective at relationship management, Wheatley (2005) finds that 
organizations need periodic face to face meetings to establish and reinforce the human 
relationships necessary for sharing knowledge. Wheatley states,  
It’s important to remember that technology does not connect us. Our 
relationships connect us, and once we know the person or team, then we use the 
technology to stay connected. We share knowledge because we are in 
relationship, not because we have broader bandwidth available (p. 153). 
Expectancy Violation Theory 
One promising area of research with implications for workgroups is the 
development of Expectancy Violation Theory (EVT) by Burgoon (2003) discerning the 
positive and negative valences of rapport.  
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EVT frames interpersonal communication patterns and their outcomes within the 
context of expectancies and violations of those expectancies. Expectancies are 
enduring patterns of anticipated verbal and nonverbal behavior for a particular 
individual that are appropriate, desired or preferred. Violations of these 
expectancies occur when actions are sufficiently discrepant as to be noticeable 
by the receiver. A key assumption of EVT is that prior to or during an interaction, 
interactants form impressions of one another that have valences (either positive 
or negative) attached to them (p. 3-4).  
This apt chemical analogy of valence—suggesting covalent bonding potential—is 
striking in the context of a prospective field of expectancy and potentiality that may be 
modulated by the intentionality of its dialogical containers.  
Balancing Group Culture with Strategy 
 Handy (1996) speaks of ‘federated organizations’ where dedicated teams have 
autonomy to collaborate on ‘portfolio work’ which is employment tied to specific team 
projects. He compares the British and Japanese models for group work and suggests 
that each borrow certain ideas from the other culture to strike a healthy balance 
between the Japanese over-commitment to the group and the British over-emphasis on 
“duty to the world” (p. 132). Unbalanced commitment to homogenous workgroups as 
seen in Japan can lead to groupthink and burnout from unbalanced lives and singular 
focus. Presence and being in the moment intersubjectively with teammates does not 
necessarily mean commitments to the team outside of work or extended work hours that 
disrupt family and personal lives.  
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Going forward, Handy predicts that people will increasingly accept portfolio work 
with one, two, or several organizational teams or workgroups. Given the American 
cultural bent for competition and superstars, and workplace roots in Taylorism, it seems 
likely there will be a considerable resistance to deeply engage in dialogical 
intersubjective relations here for a long time because compensation systems, training 
programs, and organization structure are not conducive to it in critical measure. Culture 
trumps everything. Groups that can break free from such norms have the potential to 
form their own self-directed, collaborative enterprises to work on similar projects for one 
or several other such organizations.  
Physical Location Factors that Intensify the Dialogical Container  
 A number of physical location comfort factors to consider for enhancing the 
dialogical container include transportation and proximity to home, accessibility, 
ergonomic furniture, audiovisual equipment, phones, fax machines, printers and 
computers with internet access, privacy, temperature, air pressure, humidity, allergen 
count, odor, sound distractions, light quality, colors, time of day, week, lunar cycle, and 
year, clean restrooms, access to food and drinks, special needs accommodation and 
administrative support. Many people from diverse cultures also require a private space 
for prayer several times per day. An overall distraction-free atmosphere of comfort and 
safety is imperative for dialogue.  
Summation 3 
 Positivist, Cartesian work management theories are losing currency in the 
marketplace in a global economy. Surviving and emergent organizations of all kind will 
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continue to move toward collaborative, dialogical, and networked project teams. This 




I take strong exception to Crossley’s (1996) conclusion, after examining many 
dimensions of intersubjectivity, that there is nowhere else to go with the concept and no 
instrumental utility in its measure. Crossley’s discussions traced “a common path 
through the work of Merleau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, Mead, Schutz, and Habermas” 
considered “against a background formed by the work of Husserl, Buber and Hegel” 
(preface). Recent scholarship on Husserl’s unpublished later works indicate that 
Merleau-Ponty, Derrida, Habermas, and others have each predicated their 
understandings and disagreements about intersubjectivity on Husserl’s earlier static 
phenomenology (Donohoe, 2004; Zahavi, 2001). Crossley’s exploration missed the 
implications of genetic phenomenology which implicates temporality, the streaming, 
living present, and community to open the way for a new conceptualizing of relationality.  
Donohoe’s (2004) explication of Husserl’s passive and active genesis of the ego 
substantially furthers the understanding of transcendental intersubjectivity stemming 
from its founding in the prepredicative realm of constitution. Because “there is 
[Husserl’s] pre-individual, passive givenness … it is possible to speak of a coincidence 
between ego and Other” (p. 88). This is a foundation for intersubjectivity, mutuality, and 
the shared generation of realities. Constructivism with its trivial, radical, social, cultural, 
critical, and constructionist dimensions—as described by student Dougiamas (1998)—
seems to be a valid and useful alternative to Kantian epistemology and not mutually 
exclusive to the relational perspective we have followed here.  
Development of the relational form of psychoanalysis that utilizes mutuality on 
both the conscious and unconscious levels to co-construct meaning between therapist 
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and analysand and recognize the uniqueness of the dyad is a complete paradigm shift. 
This has changed the approach to understanding (Verstehen) and the human condition 
in most of the social sciences by co-construction of realities through relationships 
situated in the temporal, streaming, living present. As each ego acquires sedimentations 
of experience, habitualities form to express language and behavior patterns and anchor 
expectations. Through dialogical relationship each offers a mirror for the other and 
alternate patterns to compare and differentiate those patterns within unfolding 
circumstances. If such relationship is authentic and mutual, the sharing is 
transcendental and leads from fragmentation toward a Gestalt. Absence of dialogue and 
mutuality leaves a subjectivity with the sedimentations of its narrow experience to 
become entrenched in habitualities and representations that are parochial and 
incongruent with others except in a most tangential way. This can calcify boundaries 
that impede the sharing of knowledge and development of larger truths and realities.  
Wheeler’s (2000) posit “I am loved therefore I am,” reveals a clear portal into the 
new paradigm of intersubjective relationality that is quickly displacing the Cartesian 
positivism that has ruled organization science through most of the 20th century. The 
polysemic nature of intersubjectivity as described by Coelho and Figueiredo (2003), 
Bråten (2003), de Quincey (2005), and others are reconcilable, supplemental and 
without contradiction. The concept of symbolic interaction stemming from the work of 
Mead was synchronously developed at the same time Husserl defined intersubjectivity. 
The interactionist takes as a given that those who interact with words and action 
intersubjectively share a common reality at that particular point in time.  
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Gallese’s (2003) conception of Einfühlung as “an intentional form of perception 
by analogy” and hypothesis that a neural substrate of mirror neurons, when activated, 
creates a “subpersonally instantiated common space” provide a neurobiological 
foundation for the pre-conscious elements of intersubjectivity. That common space can 
be seen as coincidental with Issac’s (1999) dialogical container and with the 
intersubjective field from which new shared meaning arises.  
Bohm (1996) speaks of assumptions developed from one's cultural ground and 
the chunking or snapshots taken at other times for other purposes that block the 
creation of shared meaning. These assumptions—whether formed of personal or 
cultural habituations—situated in a new or emergent culture will create and extend the 
storming phase of group formation and otherwise impede generation of new knowledge, 
understanding, and shared meaning. At this particular stage—which Issacs (1999) 
would call “field 2”— the use of carefully facilitated elenctic dialogue may decongest the 
container of unexamined assumptions, thereby reducing or eliminating Argyris & 
Schön’s (1996) “defensive routines” and moving the group to “Model 2” behavior and 
away from the “ladder of inference.” As “the content of sub-cultural differences begins to 
assert itself” (Bohm, 1996), the Socratic elenchus can reveal the gap between Argyris’ 
(1993) “espoused values and values in use;” and it can be gently used to bring 
“undiscussables” into the light.  
Vygotsky’s (1979) dialectic “between changing social conditions and the 
biological substrata of behavior” within the zone of proximal development suggests a 
linkage between group development and Gallese’s (2003) “shared manifold of 
intersubjectivity.” The presence of skilled coaches and facilitators has potential to 
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intensify the common space with Cooperrider and Srivastva’s (1987) “appreciative 
inquiry” and Torbert’s (2004) “action inquiry” methods at critical inflection points in group 
development to align the shared manifold of neural patterning of pivotal values. 
Bakhtin’s rich idioms of polyphony, heteroglossia, and carnival color the language 
patterns we see with deeper meaning and he shows us in literary works where their 
misinterpretation or misapplication can be negative. 
The theme of iterative recursion comes up in discussions of Husserl, 
Wittgenstein, and Maturano. Sekerka & McCraty (2004, citing Maturano) point to 
cognitive and biological interactions leading to structural changes with recursive dyadic 
interactions to a normative baseline—evidenced by affect, behavior and acquisition of 
knowledge—the inertia of which may or may not be positive. It appears to be a natural 
process that will occur with or without attention to the intersubjective field or dialogical 
container. This neurolinguistic process can have unintended consequences pathological 
to the goals of a group. Shotter’s (1995) extraction of Wittgenstein’s reminders for 
gaining understanding of how to draw attention to how we draw attention to things 
seems to fit here as a means to group self monitoring of where the interactions are 
taking them. Complementary but more specific in methodology is Torbert’s (2004) 
“supervision” from three nested levels of feedback that constitute triple-loop feedback 
requiring presence, attention, intention, and vision. Again we see a struggling stage at 
the double-loop level of feedback vis-à-vis strong self-identity with these constructs. 
Singel (2004) remembers being told three forces stand in the way of learning: “the need 
to be right, to be in control and to look good” (p. 2) which may be very common, 
culturally frozen, defensive habitualities to explore with these forms of reflective inquiry.  
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The intersubjective psychotherapeutic methods of Kohut and others were 
developed to reintegrate individuals and groups and families. As with so many positive 
changes, the naming of phenomena is the beginning of cognitively reframing them—as 
with Sullivan’s ‘parataxic interpersonal experiences’ and Lewin’s ‘paratactic distortions’ 
leading to that field of experience connecting to intersubjectivity—to create a new 
therapeutic model. That model which employs sustained empathic inquiry; remaining in 
the frame of the other; and self-reference must now be reexamined with the naming of 
new phenomena from Husserl’s hyle, or Bohm’s implicate order, at the boundaries of 
chaos. Effective, coherent, collaborative workgroups must preempt dis-ease and 
dysfunction by engaging these tools before the fact of their need as remediation or 
therapy. Finding out how families reintegrate from dysfunction can then, as it were, lead 
to avoiding dysfunction in workgroups. Unlike families, chronically dysfunctional 
workgroups may need to be remixed where coaching is not effective due to cost.  
Shapiro’s (1998) ‘unfulfilled need for twinship affirmation’ from loss of ‘extended 
family or tribal structure’ will increasingly be addressed by the team or workgroup in 
Western culture. Since ‘twinship provides for the bonds that exist in a group’ and 
‘intersubjectivity . . . provides the perspective with which to explore those bonds’ the 
sense of belonging to these groups can promote healing and growth for individuals 
within them. Everyone needs a tribe and meaningful work to actualize. The inequality 
model of helping vs. serving (Remen, 1996; Cooper-White, 2004) is easily addressed in 
workgroups where mentoring and assisting is defined as part of the job and where daily 
quid pro quo opportunities abound in a syntonic field of mutuality.  
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From the standpoint of mental hygiene, groups of equals with requisite agency, 
resources, and mutual respect and intent to learn, reflect, and take right action should 
be able to process stress, resolve cognitive dissonance, and reconcile paradox and 
complexity far more effectively than the same number of individuals working 
independently or serially and separately. Power differentials can be a disruptive factor 
when trying to optimize creative sharing within a workgroup. It invariably erodes trust by 
compromising the I–Thou structure if it isn’t distributed in rational measure.  
The true value of developing the sensitivity to “read” intersubjectivity is two-fold: 
to guide groups or co-workers toward dialogical fixes to avoid the accumulation of 
fragmentations (baggage) and undiscussibles, and to steer the group to peak 
performance and experiences (flow). The intersubjective field then is at the heart of 
group work. In some groups it is the uncomfortable “elephant in the room” that leads 
people to think one thing and say another. In other groups it is a source of joy and 
generative collaboration.  
Revisiting our research question: What positive implications  are to be found 
through reconciliation of intersubjectivity and dialogue for postmodern collaborative 
workgroups? The preceding conclusions positively imply: that dialogue has a direct 
transcending effect on intersubjectivity; that we are given a relational form through 
which workgroup members can co-construct new meaning through mutuality; that 
dialogical relationships provide the means to rectify fragmented beliefs, and to descend 
ladders of inference; that dialogue builds and sustains an intersubjective field of 
validation, belonging, twinship, and common reality; that common reality patterns 
support uniform action and bypass defensive routines; that physical proximity of group 
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members provides a biological anchoring of Verstehen within an ‘instantiated common 
space’ that is at once nested within a ‘zone of proximal development,’ within a 
‘dialogical container,’ within an ‘intersubjective field;’ that ‘drawing attention to how we 
draw attention to things’ allows members to move forward with coherence; that a self-
reflective community of practice is open to appreciative inquiry and action inquiry 
through which triple-loop feedback is accessible with ‘presence, attention, intention, and 
vision;’ that through ‘sustained empathic inquiry, remaining in the frame of the other, 
and self-reference’ team members may thwart dis-ease and dysfunction; that 
intersubjectivity is the readable signifier of tribal bonds in the group and dialogue is the 
means through which to establish, strengthen, and affirm ‘twinship’ therein; that the 
needs of ‘I’ and ‘Thou’ are naturally balanced in a ‘syntonic field of mutuality;’ that such 
mutuality may provide the respect and intent to learn, reflect, and take right action to 
face such obstacles of our time as stress, cognitive dissonance, paradox, and 
complexity; that the dialogic container may provide a forum to elentically expose the 
erosive effects of asymmetrically imposed power; that reading the intersubjective field 
may guide members toward dialogical solutions for cognitive and spiritual 
fragmentation, shame, and fear; and that through communality, postmodern 
collaborative workgroups may aspire to peak performance and transcendent flow.  
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Leadership Implications for Group Management 
 The tectonic shifts underway in global society are not understood by most of its 
members. Changes in the environment and economy are giving those with the agency 
of capital unfettered opportunities to aggregate resources under their control in the 
name of free enterprise without consideration of the externalities of each privileged 
decision. Growing numbers of disenfranchished people will become an [It-like?] 
“problem” for the priviliged “I”s unless this “bottom of the pyramid” (see Prahalad, 2005) 
is given the opportunity to participate in the global market economy. Millions of people 
who now have gainful employment will also be displaced by the shifts to come. Small 
and medium enterprises which can network with other organizations and supply chains 
should be built as a viable way to generate meaningful work for the underemployed. 
These enterprises will need to be extremely flexible and resilient learning organizations 
capable of adapting quickly to new situations and business models. Such strong 
organizations attend to the need of all participates to feel worthy. Handy (1994) said,  
If we want to reconcile our humanity with our economics, we have to find a way 
to give more influence to what is personal and local, so that we can each feel that 
we have a chance to make a difference, that we matter. (p. 109) 
It will remain to be seen for some time whether such clusters of organization will 
federate or merely con-federate (Handy, 1994) in response to actions by governments, 
multinational mega-corporations, and the shallow calling of consumers.  
 Strong organizations begin with artful cultivation of culture among the smaller 
work groups. The successful cultivation of culture begins with the attention given to the 
individual relationships formed in daily interaction, and to the habituated behaviors of 
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each member. The intersubjective field as it fluxes with each new situation and new 
member can be intentionally modulated with skillful dialogue that includes group self-
reflection. Many factors can impede the progress of dialogue by attenuating the 
container of dialogue, which is completely avoidable where there is a shared will to 
minimize them. Purposeful training in the skills of dialogue and awareness of its 
limitations is the first priority of forming new workgroups. Members must understand 
how to optimize the container in every discussion to realize the benefits. Once people 
become engaged in dialogue, defenses fall away and trust continually grows new 
authentic relationships. Open, shared reflection on the evolving intersubjective field can 
become freeing. 
 A natural consequence of strong, positive intersubjectivity is that participants look 
forward to taking creative actions together that carry the dialogue to higher levels by 
providing new subjective experiences for each individual to share. This process leads a 
group to find more sophisticated tools, such as those described in the Postmodern 
Collaborative Workgroup section of this paper. With elevated dialogue and use of new 
tools in the form of shared models and theories, workgroups will enter into what 
Csikszentmihalyi (1993) calls a state of flow where members “act at the peak of their 
capacity” (p. 197) and find extreme gratification in the process of working and learning 
together. This drives a desire to continuously refine their communication and work 
processes, and to find systemic enhancements to raise group capacity and 
competitiveness. Workgroups at this level of shared consciousness are, for example, 
highly amenable to practicing appreciative inquiry and action inquiry, exploring problem 
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solving models and new structurations brought by new members, all the while 
continuously expectant of positive valencey with one another.  
 It’s important to remember that these tools are readily available and have been 
validated for many years. What’s needed is the shared initiative to explore them. The 
very process of investigating these various frameworks leads to healthy norm building. It 
is often overlooked that an unattended culture develops entropically, which is how so 
many organizations that grew quickly on the thrust of their brand, cheap oil, regulation 
loopholes, or political timing have become dysfunctional or obsolete from malaise.  
 Managers who would aspire to organize and motivate workgroups to combine 
their instrumental skills with intersubjective, social skills for the sake of shared goals, 
must exhibit transformational and servant leadership skills. Building a community of 
practice requires skillful recruiting, coaching, and facilitation. Once the process takes on 
its own life, the manager must work continuously to support the group in its linearly 
progressive spiral of achievement. As an outsider to the daily transactions of the group, 
the manager/coach is in a position to see if the dialogic container is being attended in 
meetings and can read the intersubjective cues with fresh eyes.  
 Communities of practice require special compensation that is not competitive 
among the members. Similar base salaries and team performance bonuses divided 
equitably can raise the level of knowledge sharing and mentoring locally within a “zone 
of proximal development” (Vygotsky, 1978) and reciprocation. The compensation of flow 
and enjoyment of working well together can outweigh concern for intrinsic levels of pay, 
especially when everyone has similar pay and the group has the means to generate 
more together, and each has the opportunity to increase his or her value to the group.  
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 High-level workgroups, built with positive social architecture, are dissipative 
structures that resist entropy by systematically apprehending complexity. “A vital culture 
is always the product of a small ‘creative minority’” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, p. 282, 
citing Toynbee). The power of one small high-level team in an organization can have an 
enormous cultural impact on a parent or client organization. Many such groups can 
change society. The future of what expert teams and groups can accomplish is limitless 
and promises to be fulfilling on many levels, as Gardner’s multiple intelligences are 
explored and mediated with emerging technology to produce generative, “evolutionary 
cells” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1993, p. 289). Unsponsored efforts such as skunkworks to 
develop low or mid-level performance teams often fail for lack of understanding or “nice 
idea, but not mine” attitudes among upper management. Those which aren’t 
marginalized or disbanded are often groups who achieve remarkable results before they 
are discovered. Upper management will often then support the initiative and praise it 
locally while gradually taking credit for it in the boardroom.  
 Upper level managers are advised to use collaborative workgroups as incubators 
for management training. This ensures the support and cultivation of high-level group 
work culture and the perpetuation of dialogue as a means to keeping intersubjective 
consciousness in focus. Without that, all enterprise is the same old same old I–It. New 
managers can practice radical listening skills and exchange knowledge with a multitude 
of stakeholders on tactical teams in preparation to network into the core, join strategic 






 It behooves managers to understand how each person in a workgroup draws his 
or her vital identity, on a multitude of intersubjective levels, from the group he or she 
works with every day. Dialogue is the means to explore and modulate that 
intersubjectivity toward wholeness and away from fragmentation. Groups and 
organizations built on that foundation will tap the generative capacity of their people to 
find new structures and solutions.  
Through this paper, my intent is to give managers, in all size organizations, an 
awareness and appreciation for the vast untapped human potential that lies relatively 
dormant within and among groups of people who work together. This is an advisory that 
Cartesian, Baconian, Newtonian, positivist, hierarchical, command-and-control 
management practices attenuate the human spirit and suppress its potential. It is a call 
to apply positive attention and intention to the realm of intersubjectivity, (symbolic 
interaction, shared manifold, collective resonance, etc.) of each work group, and to 
nurture and align it with authentic dialogue and emerging organizational theories such 
as appreciative inquiry and action inquiry. In this realm we can find our true identities 
and purpose. Through positive entrainment of our hearts and minds we may find more 
sustainable enterprise and life. It is often said that “culture trumps everything,” however 
culture is constituted by individual relationships. Relationships are more mutable and 
fragile than cultures, and it is relationships that must be valued and improved within 
organizations for lasting improvement of cultures and performance of organizations. The 
apperceptive cladding that accumulates in the psyche of the individual, and becomes 
sedimented through habituations, can be wholesome or pathological depending on the 
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mental models of management. Therein lies the opportunity for management to balance 
management by objectives with the need to nourish the collective soul of work groups 
for coherence and alignment.  
The demands of the postmodern workgroup have become extreme, such that 
productivity and creativity cannot be further sustained with carrot-and-stick incentives. 
Organizational leaders must now look for synergies within the relational thinking and 
feeling realm, and support dialogical practices and processes that are sensitive to both. 
The best performing organizational culture will reflect the attention paid to developing 
these synergies. Developing strongholds of dialogical inquiry isn’t going to be easy in 
our current culture, but it is necessary at this pivotal point in history. It requires 
courageous, unwaivering peer leadership, without which organizational management 
will fall back to autocratic manipulation. The key operations are intersubjective mutuality 





 In the spring of 1961 my extended family bought a tiny wooded plot of land on 
the lee side of a sharp turn in a river. Our location was protected by an upstream, deep 
sloping granite ledge that redirected the channel and main current to the other side of 
the river from our shore where it eroded the bank and sometimes washed out the road 
on that far side. This produced a large clock-wise oval eddy current in front of our 
location, such that the water actually flowed in an upriver direction for 20 feet out from 
our shorefront. My father was in charge of claiming a beach out of the riverbank of roots 
and boulders that fell off directly at the waters edge. As my younger brothers and 
cousins helped me dig into the bank my father directed the humus to be brought up to 
the garden, the roots and small trees to be cut and dried for firewood, and all boulders 
and stones to be used to build a 20-foot long, 4-foot wide jetty from the bank out into the 
water above the waterline on the upriver boundary of the property. Each worked 
according to his capacity and we took frequent swim breaks. 
 As the job got underway, I asked my father why he wanted the stone jetty instead 
of a stone retainer wall along the face of the property like our neighbors had. He only 
said, “watch the river, not the neighbors,” and threw a stick 20 feet out into the river. We 
watched it float up-river to the backside of the ledge and then around the entire oval 
path of the eddy current several times before the surface breeze pushed it out into the 
main current to be swept away. Then he said, “we’re building a sand-catcher.” 
After we cut the bank back about 10 feet along the 70-foot waterfront to expose 
the underlying sand, and the jetty was complete, we began to see fine soft sand 
accumulate throughout the summer with particular depth in the corner where the jetty 
68 
 
was catching it from the eddy current to form a delightful, crescent shaped beach that 
extended the original waterline out an additional 10 feet. The harsher the weather and 
faster the main channel ran, the faster our beach was replenished perpetually with 
trapped sand until our side of the jetty was submerged with sand—thanks to a granite 
ledge, a powerful current, and a systems thinker.  
 This was one of my many early lessons in systems. My father’s prescience in 
selecting this property location and pointing where to stack tons of stone helped me 
want to think ahead strategically and observe my actions and those around me moment 
to moment. The eddy current is a dissipative structure (Google Prigogine) created and 
energized by the entropy of a modulated river racing to the sea. The new beach is a 
dissipative structure energized by the eddy current and envisioned and created by 
humans working in alignment with visionary leadership and the freedom to put the 
stones where they see fit. As the forces of environmental, political, and economic 
change challenge us, we will find that societies and large organizations are too big to 
adapt in time except through the work of individuals working together effectively in small 
to moderate size groups—and each finding their own way of doing it with what they 
uniquely share and within their unique circumstances. Great workgroups are chaordic 
dissipative structures bounded by attended intersubjective field lines and managed 
dialogical containers. Just as I am herein seeking coherence within and between the 
complexity of metaphors—fields, containers, and dissipative structure—such 
workgroups can  dialogically generate new conceptual metaphors grounded in co-
occurrence and similarity correlations of shared experience (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) 
and germane to each unfolding situation.  
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From my reading of history and the sources for this paper, it is my sense that the 
focus of our will should be continuously kept on the authenticity of relationships and 
quality of communication between all actors of all shared endeavors. Resilience and 
sustainability of our organizations rests squarely on the quality of our interpersonal 
relationships and the behaviors that nourish them. Theories, models, and methods that 
can modulate that quality in a positive, life-affirming manner should be embraced, 
learned, and integrated into group processes to evolve from fragmentation to Gestalts of 
dissipative structure through alignment of intention with leadership, convivial tools, and 
agape. I see a wealth of tools such as discussed in this paper that seem to be collecting 
dust in out-of-print book shops.  
As roads wash out we need to anticipate where to lay our jetties for new beach 
fronts and roads instead of fighting the current head on. As political exigencies generate 
fear and totalitarianism we need to turn to our deepest wisdom. Those of us who can 
read and think deeply, and write and speak coherently, must willfully do so. We all must 
share our values through stories, find coherent, new metaphors, and do what is best 
done together. We must courageously, ethically and empathically turn to one another 
and discover who we really are through each other, and who we will become, in all our 
diversity, together, anew. It’s not all about you—it’s all about all of us.  
My future work in this topical area will likely take me to greater depth on 
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The Dialogue Decalogue excerpts (Swidler, 1983, see below) 
1. The primary purpose of dialogue is to learn, that is, to change and grow in the 
perception and understanding of reality, and then to act accordingly. 
2. Interreligious, Interideological dialogue must be a two-sided project—within 
[and between] each religious or ideological community . 
3. Each participant must come to the dialogue with complete honesty and 
sincerity. 
4. In Interreligious, Interideological dialogue, we must not compare our ideals 
with our partner’s practice, but rather our ideals with our partner’s ideals, our 
practice with our partner’s practice. 
5. Each participant must define himself. 
6. Each participant must come to the dialogue with no hard-and-fast 
assumptions as to where the points of disagreement are.  
7. Dialogue can take place only between equals, or par turn part.  
8. Dialogue can take place only on the basis of mutual trust. 
9. Persons entering into Interreligious, Interideological dialogue must be at least 
minimally self-critical of both themselves and their own religious or ideological 
traditions. 
10. Each participant eventually must attempt to experience the partner’s religion 
or ideology from within. 
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